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If the attorney cannot get the necessary information because of witness
hostility or because the moving party has sole control over the information, then he must move for a protective order under rule 56(f).
Otherwise, he runs the risk that the testimonial evidence will be afforded
credibility as a matter of law and that summary judgment will be granted
for.the moving party.
In Kidd v. Early the North Carolina Supreme Court set out a flexible standard for determining the sufficiency of testimonial evidence on
a motion for summary judgment. With the help of this standard, the
courts can now determine with greater accuracy whether testimonial
evidence has created an issue of fact that must be presented to the jury.
This promotes judicial expediency by weeding out cases that contain no
factual disputes at the summary judgment level, without jeopardizing
the parties' right to a jury trial.
REBECCA WEIANT

Consitutional Law-Property and Liberty Interests in Public
Employment
The proposition that a government cannot unreasonably restrict
the exercise of constitutional rights by its employees has become a basic
tenet of constitutional law. 1 However, in the absence of a specific statute or regulation to the contrary, a government's authority to dismiss
its employees for purely arbitrary reasons, or for no reason at all, has
remained essentially unchallenged. 2 Except for situations in which the
government appears motivated by a desire to stifle constitutional privileges, the maximum protection afforded a public employee against discharge has been some form of hearing at which he can appeal the decision. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in the companion
1. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
2. The United States Supreme Court noted in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) that "(t]he Court has consistently recognized that . . . the interest
of a government employee in retaining his job can be summarily denied. It has become
a settled principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be
revoked at the will of the appointing officer." Id. at 896.
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cases of Board of Regents v. Roth' and Perry v. Sinderman,4 held that
not all employees are entitled to such protection. The discharged employee must show that the loss of his job will deprive him of "liberty"
or "property" before he qualifies for the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees of due process.5
In determining whether a public employee who is threatened with
dismissal has a right to due process, the Supreme Court's standard of
inquiry, as set out in Roth and Perry and reaffirmed in the recent case
of Bishop v. Wood, 6 is whether the employee has acquired either a liberty or property interest in his employment. Under this test, there are
two classes of public employees-those with a sufficient interest in their
jobs to warrant some due process protection and those whose claims
are inadequate to merit any constitutional consideration. Only after an
employee overcomes the threshold barrier of demonstrating a "legitimate interest in employment" is he entitled to any protection at all, and
then the form of his due process protection may be far short of a formal
adversary proceeding. The required degree of protection will be decided by the court in each case by balancing the employee's interests
against those of the government.1 Although the majority in Bishop utilized the Roth-Perry test in adjudicating the plaintiff-employee's claim
to a due process pretermination hearing, the result reached in that
case may indicate a significant reduction in the scope of judicial review
of government personnel decisions.
In Bishop, officer Carl Bishop, after serving for almost three years
on the Marion, North Carolina police force, was dismissed in 1972 by
the city manager of Marion upon the recommendation of the chief of
police. A city ordinance specified four possible grounds for the dismissal of a "permanent employee," such as Bishop, and further provided that upon request, any dismissed employee could obtain written
notice of the date of and reasons for his discharge. 8 The ordinance
3. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
5. "[INor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or. property, without
due process of law.... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
7. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
8. The Personnel Ordinance of the city of Marion provides:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over
a period of time shall be notified in What way his work is deficient and
what he must do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee
fails to perform work up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may
be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given
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made no provision for any type of pretermination hearing at which an
employee might contest the sufficiency of the alleged cause for his termination, and accordingly, Bishop received no such hearing.
Relying on 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Bishop brought suit against the
city manager, chief of police, and city of Marion seeking reinstatement,
and back pay. In his complaint, he contended that as a "permanent
employee" he had a constitutional right to a due process pretermination
hearing. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Bishop had failed to demonstrate a sufficient
liberty or property interest in his job to invoke due process protection."0
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 1 and certiorai was granted. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Stevens, upheld
Bishop's dismissal and affirmed the district court's view that under the
Marion ordinance and North Carolina law, Bishop "'held his position
at the will and pleasure of the city.' ",12 A clear understanding of how
the Court disposed of Bishop's claim to property and liberty interests
in his job can best be obtained by separate consideration of those issues.
PROPERTY

According to Roth, a discharged employee must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to continued employment before he has
been deprived of "property" under the fourteenth amendment. 18 Such
a claim of entitlement cannot be based upon the employee's mere subjective expectations, but must be founded upon "existing rules or understandings"' 4 with his employer (the state), as set forth in a statute,
ordinance, or contractual provision establishing a definite duration for
written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date and reasons
for his discharge if he shall request such a notice.
96 S. Ct. at 2077 n.5 (quoting art. II, § 6 of the Ordinance).
The ordinance also provided that all city employees would be considered "probationary" employees when first hired, but c6uld attain the status of a "permanent" employee after six months' satisfactory employment. See 96 S.Ct. at 2082 n.5 (dissenting opinion).
9. Justice Stevens' majority opinion points out that the city was not a proper
defendant, not being a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. 96 S. Ct. at 2077
n.1. For a more complete analysis of this issue, see Note, Federal Jurisdiction-The
Status of Public Officials as "Persons" Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 54 N.C.L. REv.
1062 (1976).
10. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
11. 498 F.2d 1341 (1973).
12. 96 S. Ct. at 2078 (quoting 377 F. Supp. at 504). The decision was five
to four, with Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun authoring dissenting opinions.
Justice Marshall concurred with the Brennan and White dissents.
13. 408 U.S. at 577.
14. Id.
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The

Court' 5 further noted that the Constitution did not create property in-

terests but only extended protection to already existing interests whose
"dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem

from an independent source such as state law."'

6

Thus, the approach

adopted by the Court in Roth requires an initial examination of "an
independent source such as state law"' 7 to characterize the nature of
the relationship that exists between the government employer and employee. This relationship, as defined by state law, is then examined
under federal law to determine whether it constitutes a protected property
18
interest.
Perry established that an employee who has no written statutory
or contractual entitlement to tenure can still claim due process protection by demonstrating the existence of an implied contract or an informal, but widely understood rule of the work-place "that certain employees shall have the equivalent to tenure."' 9 With the addition of this
"constructive tenure" concept, the Roth-Perry standard for determining
when an employee has a property interest in his job was left sufficiently
nebulous to allow the lower federal courts considerable latitude in applying it. As a result, the large number of suits initiated by public employees claiming a right to a pretermination hearing have received in20
consistent treatment.
15. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The vote was five to
three, with Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissenting and Justice Powell taking
no part in the case.
16. 408 U.S. at 577.
17. Id.
18. Plaintiff in Roth was a teacher at Wisconsin State University whose oneyear employment contract was not renewed. The Court ruled that the Wisconsin statutes regarding tenure of state university professors and the specific terms of plaintiff's
appointment created and controlled any interest Roth might have in his job. Id. at
576-78. Since neither the statute nor the contract could support a claim of entitlement
to reemployment, the Court concluded that he had no constitutionally protected property
interest in being rehired and therefore could not demand a due process hearing reviewing the decision not to renew his contract. Id. at 578.
19. Perry involved a state college professor who received neither notice, explanation nor a hearing upon his release after the conclusion of the last of four one-year
contracts with the university. The college system in which Perry was employed had
no official or statutory tenure system for its professors. Perry claimed, however, that
the college had a de facto tenure program (the existence of which was itimated in
the school's faculty guide), and that he had tenure under that program. Although
the Court did not immediately grant him a due process hearing on these grounds,
it remanded the case to the district court to give Perry an opportunity to prove that
the school's policies were as he alleged. If he .could successfully demonstrate a property interest upon remand, then he was to receive a hearing at which he could challenge the sufficiency of the reasons for his release. 408 U.S. at 602-03.
20. In some cases this inconsistency has been manifested by the varying results
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The uncertainty generated by the Supreme Court in its formulation of the pliable Roth-Perry property interest test was by no means
dissipated in its next pronouncement regarding a dismissed public employee's rights to due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy,2 ' five Justices
wrote opinions that displayed widespread disagreement.22 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, seemingly abandoned the second

criterion in the bifurcated Roth-Perry approach, which initially determines whether an employee has a sufficient liberty or property interest
to merit due process, and then ascertains what level of due process the
Federal Constitution requires in the given situation.28 He concluded
that even when a government has accorded its employees a property
interest in their jobs, it is not bound by federal notions of due process
but still retains the right to set up any type of procedure it desires,'
no matter how minimal, to safeguard that interest.24 Under Justice
Rehnquist's view, since an employee's entitlement to his job arises under a statute, it may be conditioned by a statutory limitation upon procedural due process protection.

Six of the Justices in Arnett rejected the plurality approach and
adhered largely to the Roth-Perryview. Justice Whitenoted:
The fact that the origins of the property right are with the State
makes no difference for the nature of the. procedures required.
While the State may define what is and what is not property,
once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due
achieved under this test within a single court. For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals (which affirmed the district court opinion in Bishop) has vacillated significantly. It strictly construed an employment contract in Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1
(1973), and a statute in Brown v. Hirst, 443 F.2d 899 (1971), to deny public employees access to a due process hearing, but liberally found a property interest even in
the absence of statutory tenure in Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (1975). Moreover,
in Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (1972), the Fourth Circuit found that under the
Roth-Perry test, "continuous employment over a significant period of time-such as
appellant's 29 years-can amount to the equivalent of tenure." Id. at 181. Only
two years later, however, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina refused to follow Fraley and held that a teacher with 19 years'
service did not have tenure and that "longevity of employment" alone does not establish
the existence of a property interest. Cannady v. Person County Bd. of Educ., 375
F. Supp. 689 (1974).
21. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
22. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality. Id. Justice Powell filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 164. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at
171. Justices Douglas and Marshall filed separate dissents. Id. at 203 (Douglas);
id. at 206 (Marshall).
23. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
24. 416 U.S. at 152.
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process, and as I understaid it six members
of the Court are in
25
agreement on this fundamental proposition.

A number of other issues were also under consideration in Aniett,26 and
the Court reached such diverse results that Justice Stevens' remark in
Bishop that "Arnett sheds no light on the problem presented by this
case" 27 is understandable. It is also evasive, however, since six of the
Justices specifically agreed that a statute s guaranteeing continued employment absent cause for discharge creates a legitimate claim of entitlement to the job and affords the employee the right to a due process
hearing.29
Given the facts of Bishop, a reasonable application of the RothPerry standard could easily have justified a finding that Bishop had a
legitimate property interest in his job. Under the Marion personnel
ordinance, not only was he classified as a "permanent employee," but
his removal was conditioned upon the presence of certain enumerated
causes.30 In light of the Arnett case, this "for cause" qualification of
the ordinance certainly could provide a strong basis for concluding that
a property right was present.31 Although Justice Stevens, in writing
for the majority, conceded that the Marion ordinance could be read as
creating a property interest in employment,3 2 he declined to do so,
but relied instead upon the district court's interpretation.
The district court's analysis of Bishop's claim to a property right
was less than exhaustive. First, it noted that Bishop had no written
contract that conferred tenure and that the city personnel resolution
made no express guarantee of tenure or continued employment. The
court then ended its review of the case's circumstances and turned to
state law for guidance in interpreting the ordinance. Citing Still v.
Lance, 3 the court found that in North Carolina, a contract for em25. Id. at 185.
26. The Court also considered whether the applicable personnel statute was unconstitutionally vague, and addressed several questions relating to the nature and timing
of the employee's evidentiary due process hearing.
27. 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.8.
28. The statute involved in Arnett provided that a permanent employee could
not be removed other than for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 416 U.S. at 151-52.
29. See opinion of Justice White, id. at 181, and opinion of Justice Powell, id..
at 166.
30. See note 8 supra.
31. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
33. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971). In a short, but well reasoned dissent,
Justice Blackinun questioned the applicability of this case to the facts of Bishop. 96
S. Ct. at 2085.
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ployment with no provision regarding duration or date of termination
is terminable at the will of either party and gives an employee no legitimate expectation of continued employment.34 Thus, the district court
ignored Bishop's argument that the ordinance created a property right
by providing for dismissal upon cause, and held that since there was
no express statutory or contractual grant of tenure, he held his job "at
the will and pleasure of the city." 5
•By upholding the district court's "tenable" reading of the ordinance even though admitting that its own independent examination of'
the ordinance "might have justified a different conclusion,"' 0 the majority in Bishop appears to have significantly narrowed the scope of federal court review of public employee dismissals. Although the RothPerry test contemplates reference to state law as an aid in defining the
nature of the employment relationship in a given context, it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court in those cases intended to foreclose further examination of the facts and their logical implications.17 Indeed, Roth
and Perry allow the court to determine whether the employment relation, as defined by state law, does or does not create a property
right. 8
By discarding the Roth rationale as a justification for an active role
for federal courts in defining property interests in public employment,
the majority in Bishop has opted for a more restrained approach.
Bishop emphasizes that the federal court's primary duty is to look to
the intent of the legislature that created the job from which an employee has been removed in order to determine if a property interest
has been created. When the statutes are unclear on this issue, Bishop
34. 377 F. Supp. at 504.
35. Id.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
37. At least several lower courts have not felt compelled to do so. See Vance
v. Chester County d. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 824 n.1 (4th Cir. 1974);
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 1973); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d
176 (5th Cir. 1973). See also note 20 supra.
38. Justice Brennan's dissent argues that Perry and Roth require court review
of such circumstances as the common practices of the employer and expectations of
the employee that are based on those practices or upon his probable understanding
of the local ordinance. He contends that "at least before a state law is definitively
construed as not securing a 'property' interest, the relevant inquiry is whether it was
objectively reasonable for the employee to believe he could rely on continued employ.
ment." 96 S. Ct. at 2082 (emphasis added).
Justice Brennan's view, that a unilateral expectancy of continued employment creates a property right when objective circumstances justify that expectation, was rejected
by the majority and characterized by Justice Stevens as a "remarkably innovative suggestion that' we develop a federal common law of property rights

at 2080 n.14.

....

"

96 S. Ct.
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suggests that the court defer to state cases for clarification rather than
indulge in its own interpretations. Obviously, such an approach will
minimize independent examination of the facts in search of a constructive property interest as was found in Perry. Thus, Bishop's contention
that his understanding of the city ordinance and of his "permanent"
status induced a reasonable belief that he enjoyed tenure was given no
weight by the court in the absence of specific allegations that such belief was widely held among Marion policemen or fostered by his employer.
If the method of deferring to state law employed by Bishop
is utilized in the future, it would be difficult for the courts to recognize
a property right to employment in many cases even when an ordinance
is not worded ambiguously. The common law of almost every state
coincides with Still v. Lance in construing contracts of employment that
mention no period of duration to be terminable at the will of either
party. 39 Moreover, since few state legislatures or city councils were
aware at the time they created a job that an employee's rights to due
process could depend upon their intent, most statutes and ordinances
are probably unclear on this issue.4 0
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White accused the majority of
adopting Justice Rehnquist's Arnett position, previously rejected by a
majority of the Court.41 White read the majority opinion as holding
that when the state creates an entitlement to employment, it also has
the power to establish any procedure it desires to effect that entitlement, even if such procedure does not meet minimum standards of due
process. This interpretation appears somewhat strained. The majority
held that Bishop never acquired a property interest and thus had no
occasion to determine whether Marion's procedure was adequate for
safeguarding such an interest. 2 However, by holding that the ultimate
authority to define "property" for purposes of the fourteenth amend39. E.g., Land v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 231, 203 S.E.2d 316 (1973);
Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974); see Annot, 161
A.L.R. 706, 707 (1946).
40. Note, The Due Process-Rights of Public Employees, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 310,
348 (1975).
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2083; see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. Justice White
based his accusation upon language used by both Justice Stevens and the district court
to the effect that Bishop's rights were not abrogated since the procedure established
in the ordinance-i.e., sending written notice of the date of dismissal, etc.-was followed. 96 S. Ct. at 2083.
42. What Bishop does appear to conclude is that if an ordinance provides for
any type of dismissal procedure, even if it does not confer a property right, then
the government-employer must still comply with the procedure. See 96 S. Ct. at 2077-

79.
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ment resides with the states, the majority clearly intimates that government employers may now avoid any due process limitation upon their
powers to fire.their employees merely by deciding that the jobs do not
43
constitute "property.
LIBERTY

Board of Regents v. Roth 44 also developed the Supreme Court's
standard for determining when an interest in "liberty" has been impaired to the extent that due process protection is mandated. According to Roth, a public employee is entitled to a due process hearing
if the dismissal imposes a. social stigma upon him or is carried out in
a manner that may deprive him of future employment. That this twopronged test has proved as difficult to apply with exactness as the RothPerry deprivation of property standard is evidenced by the widely divergent results reached in the lower courts. 5
For discharge to amount to a social stigma, the employer must
make charges against the employee "that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community." 46 Although Roth did not
provide a definite indication of what degree of stigma requires a hearing affording the employee a chance to clear his name, 47 it did clearly
require that some potentially damaging reason for dismissal be given.
This requirement seemingly furnishes employers with an incentive
for not notifying the employee of the reasons for his dismissal, since
in the Court's view there can be no social stigma when there are no
allegations made.4 8 In applying this "social stigma" test to the facts
of Bishop, Justice Stevens found that Bishop could not claim that his
good name was stigmatized since there was no public disclosure of the
49
reasons for his dismissal.
43. See dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, id. at 2082 n.4.
44. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

45. For a survey of cases representing this disparity, see Note, supra note 40,
at 330-35.
46. 408 U.S. at 573. The Court indicated that allegations of dishonest or immoral
conduct would constitute such charges. Id.
47. The Court gave no more precise statement of what would constitute social
stigma then a quotation from Wisconsin v. Constantineau: "'Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."' 408 U.S. at
573 (quoting 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
48.- But see Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973), in which the court
noted that "silence will often work greater damage to the dismissed person's reputation
than the worst of reasons." Id. at 680.
49. The alleged reasons for Bishop's dismissal-insubordination, causing low
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The second type of situation in which dismissal can violate an employee's right to liberty as described by Roth occurs when the termina-

tion "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." 50 To
meet this standard, a dismissed employee's proof must go beyond a

mere showing that he is "somewhat less attractive to other employers" 51
as a result of being fired. The majority 6pinion in Bishop omitted any

discussion of this "harm to future employment" test and focused exclusively upon the question of disclosure to the general public. Justice
Brennan's dissent pointed out this omission and argued that disclosure

of the damaging reasons for Bishop's dismissal, 2 would probably be
made to future employers.

Consequently, he reasoned that Bishop was

thus entitled to a hearing at which he could challenge the merits of
the accusations against him.
The effectiveness of Justice Brennan's incisive argument may
have been diluted by the apparent lack of proof at the trial level that
other police departments routinely request the reasons for a potential
employee's prior dismissal or that the city of Marion would disclose
those reasons. 53 Clearly, such proof would have provided Bishop a
strong basis for arguing deprivation of liberty under the "harm to future

employment" test. If the omission of that test means that the Supreme
Court has dropped the second tier from the Roth liberty test sub silentio, then the implications for public .employees may be grave indeed.
Obviously, substantial damage to future employment opportunities can
occur if stigmatizing reasons for dismissal are disclosed to potential employers.5 4 Although many states have enacted legislation that protects
the privacy of state .and local government employee personnel remorale and poor attendance at training classes-were privately communicated to him
by the city manager. Even though these reasons did eventually become public as
the result of Bishop's lawsuit, the Court held that the disclosure must precede the
filing of the claim. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
50. 408 U.S. at 573.
51. Id. at 574 n.13.
52. See note 49 supra for a list of those reasons, the gravity of which prompted
Justice Brennan to remark: "It is difficult to imagine a greater 'badge of infamy'
that could be imposed on one following petitioner's calling; in a provision [sic] in
which prospective employees are invariably investigated, petitioner's job prospects will
be severely constricted by governmental action in this case." 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
53. Justice Brennan based his speculations on "common sense." 96 S. Ct. at
2081 n.2.
54. Roth held that such a disclosure was a deprivation of liberty and emphasized
the seriousness of the consequences by quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath: "'To be deprived not only of present government employment but of future
opportunity for it certainly is no small injury."' 408 U.$. at 574 (quoting 341 U.S.
123, 185 (1951)).
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cords,"' such statutes often contain exceptions that permit inspections
of these records by other governmental units."" Moreover, some states

still classify personnel files as "public documents," and thus place no
restrictions upon the number of people who can discover the reasons
57
for an employee's discharge.

As a final argument petitioner Bishop alleged that he was dismissed on the grounds of false accusations.

He submitted affidavits

of fellow officers specifically refuting the charges made by the chief
of police; the Supreme Court, in considering defendant's motion for
summary judgment, had to accept the statements contained therein as
true. Nonetheless, the majority concluded that even if he were fired
for false or erroneous reasons, Bishop had no claim to judicial relief
since the false statements were never released to the public. In explaining this holding, Justice Stevens revealed a fear that appears to
underlie the majority's philosophy in Bishop-that federal courts may
be inundated by an ever-increasing tide of lawsuits by discharged
public employees. As to Bishop's argument regarding the falsity of the
reasons for his dismissal, Justice Stevens observed: "A contrary evalu-,
ation of his contention would enable every discharged employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former supervisor
made a mistake."' 58 Justice Stevens acknowledged that public employers will always make "incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions,"
but that "the federal court is not the appropriate forum" for granting
relief to the victims of such decisions 5 9
55. E.g., N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160A-168 (Cum. Supp. 1975); see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 5-199 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
56. For instance, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(c)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
An official of an agency of the State or federal government, or any
political subdivision of the State, may inspect any portion of a personnel
file when such inspection is deemed by the official having custody of such
records to be inspected to be necessary and essential to the pursuance of
a proper function of the inspecting agency ....
Thus, if an employee who was dismissed by one city applied for employment in another
city, the first city could find that it is "necessary . .. to the pursuance of a proper
function" of the personnel office of the second city to allow inspection of the employee's file. See id.
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.01, .012 (Harrison 1975 & Cune. Supp,
1975). Florida's Attorney General has interpreted the Florida Public Records Act
to require that personnel files of public employees be maintained as public records,
open to inspection by all. Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 073-212, 073-51 (1973). See generally Note, Privacy of Information in Florida Public Employee Personnel Files, 27
U. FLA. L. REV.481 (1975).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
59. Id.

19771

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

253

CONCLUSION

To effectuate its desire to reduce federal court involvement in
public employee personnel cases, the Supreme Court in Bishop established that state law is the final arbiter of a public employee's status.
Bishop did not completely abandon the principles of Roth and.Perry,
but attempted to streamline the courts' application of those principles
by deferring to state law as a substitute for independent federal court
analysis of a plaintiff's "property interest" in his employment. Furthermore, it narrowed the scope of an employee's loss of "liberty" to situations where potentially damning reasons for dismissal are made public.6 0 Although Bishop plainly reaffirms the settled principle that.
absent special circumstances, a public employee's general interest in
keeping his job is not sufficient to entitle him to due process of law,
government employers, by avoiding public disclosure of "stigmatizing"
reasons for dismissal, and by wording their personnel ordinances unambiguously either to guarantee or to deny employees a property right
to their jobs, can determine the legal rights of their employees. Hopefully, in making these choices, government employers will be motivated
by principles of fairness and good personnel management rather than
merely a desire to comply with the now minimal Supreme Court requirements.
Removal of judicial checks upon the government's power to dismiss its employees could lead to abuses; and if employees have only
a limited right to question the grounds for a dismissml, employee fear
of being disciplined arbitrarily may inhibit their activities in areas of
their lives where the government has no right to be. Although the
Court still recognizes its duty to prevent dismissals of public employees
that are based on the employer's desire "to curtail or to penalize the
exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights," ' . its decision in Bishop could indirectly result in such curtailments by creating
a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of the freedoms of speech, reli-

gion, or association.
BENTFORD

E.

MARTIN.

60. The notion that free grants of tenure to public employees could reduce efficiency and promote elitism may have been an underlying consideration in the Court's
approach, although its primary motive apparently was to insure that federal courts
do not become "super-legislatures" with power over state and local personnel policies.

61. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.

